

The cover features a dark green vertical bar on the left with a downward-pointing arrow. On the right, a dark green vertical bar with an upward-pointing arrow is partially visible. The background is a light green grid with various currency symbols: the Japanese Yen (¥) at the top left, the US Dollar (\$) at the top center, the British Pound (£) on the left side, the Euro (€) at the bottom left, the Indian Rupee (₹) at the bottom center, and the Chinese Yuan (元) at the bottom right. A Bitcoin symbol (₿) is also present. A central graphic shows a person icon, a dollar sign, and a starburst symbol. The title text is centered on the right side.

Commission of Inquiry
into
**Money Laundering
in British Columbia**

Final Report

June 2022

The Honourable Austin F. Cullen
Commissioner

Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia

Austin F. Cullen, Commissioner

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June 3, 2022

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AND TO:

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The Honourable Mike Farnworth
Minister of Public Safety and
Solicitor General and Deputy Premier
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Dear Mr. Attorney and Ministers:

Re: Final Report


I am pleased to deliver to you the Final Report of the Public Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia, pursuant to section 4(2)(c)(ii) of the Terms of Reference, established by Order in Council 2019-238.

This Report sets out my findings and recommendations resulting from an extensive review of the evidence I heard from nearly 200 witnesses and the 1,063 exhibits filed during 130 days of hearings into the matters set out in paragraphs 4(1) and (2) of the Terms of Reference.

I trust that my Report will contribute to an understanding of the nature and extent of money laundering in British Columbia and that my recommendations will help to abate this pernicious problem.

I consider it a privilege and an honour to have served as Commissioner.

Yours truly,



Austin F. Cullen,
Commissioner

AFC/mw
Enclosure

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Commissioner

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When this Commission of Inquiry was established on May 15, 2019, I recognized that I would need a first-class team to meet the challenges of inquiring into, understanding, and explaining as complex, wide-ranging, and elusive a subject as money laundering in British Columbia's economic and social life.

I was extremely fortunate to be able to retain Brock Martland, QC, and Patrick McGowan, QC, as senior Commission counsel. The involvement of Mr. Martland and Mr. McGowan in all aspects of the Commission's work from its inception until its conclusion has been extraordinary.

On the administrative side of the Commission, I was able to persuade Dr. Leo Perra and Ms. Cathy Stooshnov to serve as executive director and as manager of administrative and financial services, respectively. Their performance of their duties was exemplary and very helpful to the Commission in achieving its objectives, while remaining within budget.

The team of lawyers assembled to unearth, prepare, and present the evidence during the Commission's hearings was of the very highest quality. In addition to Mr. McGowan and Mr. Martland, the legal team included Alison Latimer, QC, Nicholas Isaac, Eileen Patel, Kyle McCleery, Kelsey Rose, Steven Davis, and Charlotte Chamberlain.

Two excellent lawyers were retained to serve as policy counsel, Tam Boyar as senior policy counsel and Dahlia Shuhaibar as junior policy counsel. Both Mr. Boyar and Ms. Shuhaibar worked tirelessly to consider, assess, and analyze the evidence to identify potential recommendations on crucial policy and practice issues. Their careful assessments and analytical skills are woven into the fabric of both the Interim and the Final Reports.

In addition, the Commission was aided by very helpful advice from Professor Gerry Ferguson, whose expertise was gained from many years of teaching and writing about corruption and money laundering.

I also had the great benefit of wisdom and experience from Keith Hamilton, QC, who was retained as a consultant to give invaluable advice and guidance to the legal team. There is likely no lawyer in British Columbia with more experience working with commissions of inquiry than Mr. Hamilton. He brought a wealth of experience to the Commission.

I was very fortunate to be able to rely on Doug Kiloh and Don Panchuk, two former police officers whose investigative skills were of great assistance to the Commission. I also benefitted greatly from the analytical efforts of Adam Ross in understanding and communicating aspects of money laundering activities.

The Commission was able to rely on a strong team of administrative staff to perform essential tasks. Linda Peter and subsequently Mary Williams provided invaluable

support as my administrative assistants. Ms. Peter and Ms. Williams also fulfilled other important administrative roles at the Commission.

Phoenix Leung was seconded from the Court Services Branch, where she worked as a Clerk of the Supreme Court. She played an important role as registrar for the Commission by managing the electronic hearings, swearing in or affirming witnesses, and marking and keeping track of the many exhibits filed at the hearings.

Shay Matters fulfilled an important role at the Commission. Although she was originally hired as an administrative assistant, she became an information technology analyst when the events of the pandemic compelled the Commission to conduct all of its hearings and many meetings electronically.

Natasha Tam and Sarah LeSage each played an important role in the work of the Commission by managing and organizing the many volumes of exhibits and transcripts of the evidence. They each also made important contributions to the creation of the Final Report by reviewing and fact-checking the text and footnotes.

Scott Kingdon brought his experience and expertise in web design and management to the Commission. Mr. Kingdon was responsible for creating and maintaining the Commission's website, which was critical for the public's access to and understanding of the Commission's work.

Christine Rowlands brought great skill and ability to her role as an editor and proofreader, as did Christine Joseph as report and research counsel.

Tom Norman of Kapow Creative provided excellent service in designing and publishing the report.

I would also like to acknowledge the work done by Ruth Atherley and her team at AHA Creative Strategies Inc., who engaged with the media and the public to keep them abreast of the significant developments in the hearings and the work of the Commission. Ms. Atherley and her team, Paul Holman, Roxanne Snopek, and Laurie Hanley, also helped to edit the Final Report.

Finally, I am grateful to Madam Justice France Charbonneau, the Honourable Dennis O'Connor, and the Honourable Bruce Cohen for their sage advice based on their experience as commissioners in very challenging commissions of inquiry.

As is apparent, it took many people to bring this Commission of Inquiry to a successful conclusion. I am grateful to all of them for their hard work and dedication.

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